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Abstract
This paper investigates how an incumbent monopolist can weaken
potential rivals or deter entry in the output market by manipulating
the access of these rivals in the input market. We analyze two polar
cases. In the first one, the input market is assumed to be competitive
with the input being supplied inelastically. We show that this situation
opens the door to entry deterrence. Then, we assume that the input is
supplied by a single seller who chooses the input price. In this case, we
show that entry deterrence can be reached only through merger with
the seller of the input.
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1 Introduction
The competitive effects of upstream market control have been extensively
investigated under the assumption that this control is exercised through
vertical merging activities. But alternative exclusionary practises are of-
ten observed in the upstream markets. Think of the strategy of some very
wellknown italian soccer teams, like AC Milan, which in the early nineties,
did not accept to sell some of their players they were not using to other
teams simply in order to avoid competition. Think also of young scientific
scholars trained in the best universities and hired by them while they are
still completing their Ph.D’s. Similarly, when a dominant undertaking in the
diamond industry systematically preempts any newly discovered diamond
mine in order to prevent other smaller competitors to benefit from this new
source of input supply. Another famous example with the same flavour is the
Standard Oil which accepted to pay substantial higher fares to the railways
companies to prevent these companies to carry rivals’ oil (see Granitz and
Klein (1996)).
A recent discussion paper of the DG Competition on the application of
art. 82 of the Treaty provides a good description of such exclusionary prac-
tises. In this document, one among other origins of barriers to entry in a
market is described as: ”Privileged access to supply: the allegedly dominant
undertaking may be vertically integrated or may have established sufficient
control or influence over the supply of inputs that expansion or entry by ri-
val firms may be difficult or costly ” (emphasis added). The first alternative
envisaged in this citation - vertical integration - has been extensively inves-
tigated theoretically in Salinger (1988), Ordover, Saloner and Salop (1990),
Rey and Tirole (2003) among many others, and empirically in more than 500
papers (see Joskow (2005) for a survey). An example of these empirical inves-
tigations is Martin, Norman and Snyder (2001) who, through experimental
economics techniques, find evidence that vertical integration increases the
ability of the upstream firm to bottle up output and increase prices, con-
sistently with Ordover, Salop and Saloner. In the present paper, we model
and analyse the exclusionary conduct of an incumbent from the viewpoint of
the second alternative evoked in the DG Competition discussion paper. In
particular we evaluate the strategies used by a monopolist in the downstream
market in order to prevent an entrant to have access to an input which is
essential in the production process, thereby deterring entry in the market for
the final good.
Due to the recent uprise of pro-competitive product market regulation
through antitrust authorities, competition in these markets has dramatically
increased in several industries (see OECD Outlooks, 1999). In order to pre-
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vent this competition to be too harmful to them, the firms concerned by
this regulation have tried to substitute to more traditional entry deterring
strategies used in the downstream market (like predatory pricing or horizon-
tal merging), strategies directed to the upstream markets corresponding to
inputs used in the production process of the final goods. Among these strate-
gies, we can list vertical integration, raising rivals’ costs or delocalisation of
productive activities into countries with lower input costs. The payoffs re-
sulting from the use of such strategies depend not only on the competitive
conditions under which the upstream input markets operate before their use,
but as well as on the technical relations existing between inputs and output.
It is easier for a price-maker in the downstream market to leverage its power
into a competitive input market than when it faces market power in the up-
stream market. As regarding technology, when the production of the final
good can be realised through several substitutable inputs, it is more difficult
for the downstream price-maker to succeed in controlling the output mar-
ket supply since it would require the control of several upstream markets.
Consequently, a full-fledged analysis of such strategies can hardly be per-
formed without making explicit assumptions about input market structure
and technology. In this paper, we make such explicit assumptions. From
the viewpoint of the input market structure, we analyse two polar cases,
namely, a competitive market and a bilateral one. As far as technology is
concerned, we assume a single input and linear production function for the
output. These simplifying assumptions allow us to compute unambiguously
the payoffs of the strategies opened to the incumbent monopolist. We also
assume an inelastic supply in the input market.
First, we derive the monopoly equilibrium in the output market assuming
that the input is bought at equilibrium price in the competitive input market.
Since the total amount of input available is exchanged at equilibrium, it
corresponds to the blockaded entry solution: no entry in the final market
can occur because no more input is available for potential rivals.
Then we investigate the resistance of the blockaded entry to shocks on
the supply of the scarce input, like the discovery of new natural sources,
or entry of a new upstream firm. The threat of entry in the output market
originates from these shocks. When entry is fully or partially accommodated,
the incumbent and the entrant play a Cournot game in the output market.
We show that both entry deterrence and full accommodation can be observed
at the subgame perfect equilibrium, while partial accommodation cannot be
part of a subgame perfect equilibrium of the game.
Then we examine the same question assuming a bilateral monopoly in
the input market. In this polar case, the cost of the downstream monopolist
is no longer defined at the input price corresponding to a competitive input
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market. In fact, this cost now depends on the exchange rate selected by the
upstream monopolist. As a consequence, there is no strategy available to
the downstream firm to deter entry when an external shock arises in total
input supply : the only way to escape competition in the final good market
consists in a cooperative agreement, like a merger or long term contract with
the input seller. We show that in our model the necessary condition to make
this agreement successful is satisfied.
Our work is methodologically related to the seminal paper by Dixit (1980)
on the role of investment to deter entry. The basic point made in his paper
is the incentive of an incumbent firm to undertake investments in order to
control the ex-post Cournot equilibrium which could result from the entry
of a competitor in the output market. We use a similar two-stage game
methodology to model how the incumbent controls the access in the output
market to a potential competitor. However, while Dixit does not take into
account the existence of an input market, we introduce it explicitely in our
analysis of entry deterrence. Furthermore, the rationale in our model is not
to precommit to agressive strategies, as in Dixit, but to deny the access to
the input market making infinite the input costs of the potential rivals.
Another trend of the literature to which our approach can be naturally
related deals with the possibility for the incumbent to raise rivals’ costs and
thereby induce exit of fringe competitors from the final market. Differently
from this literature, we investigate the best reply of the incumbent to the
threat of entry in an oligopolistic setup. More precisely, we deal with a
monopolist firm in the output market that intends to leverage its market
power to the input market, either by preempting input in a competitive
environment, or through a non-cooperative interaction with the upstream
firm. Also, as in the case of Dixit, the input market is not formally introduced
in the model analysed by Salop and Scheffman (1983, 1987), and it is not
explained how the incumbent proceeds in this market in order to raise the
cost of the the competitors.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we set out the monopoly
solution; in section 3, we introduce the threat of entry following a shock on
the input supply when the input market is assumed competitve. Section 4 is
devoted to the same question in a bilateral monopoly context. Finally, some
possible extensions of the model are presented in our concluding comments.
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2 Competition in the input market
2.1 Monopoly
Consider an incumbent who is a monopolist in the output market, but be-
haves as a price taker in the input market1; for simplicity we assume that
production takes place through the use of a single input via the linear tech-
nology
q = αz,
where q stands for output, z for input and α is assumed to be smaller or
equal to one 2. The supply of input is assumed totally inelastic to price but
constrained to be smaller or equal to a fixed stock S available in the market.
The firm faces a linear demand for the output a− bq. The monopolist knows
the initial level of the input S available. The profit piM(z, p) under pure
monopoly is given by
piM(z, p) = (a− bαz)αz − pz
where p stands for the price of the scarce input. Hence, we get from profit
maximization the demand zd(p) for the fixed input, which is also the quantity
of output produced divided by α:
zd(p) =
αa− p
2bα2
.
The corresponding profit piM(p)of the monopolist writes as
piM(p) =
1
4
(aα− p)2
bα2
.
Since input supply is equal to S we get from the equilibrium input market
condition the corresponding equilibrium price p∗M and, consequently, the val-
ues of the production and the profit of the incumbent. From the market
equilibrium condition we get
p∗M = aα− 2bα2S.
The price p∗M is nonnegative if the inequality S ≤ 12 abα holds. To this price
corresponds the output quantity q∗M =
def
αS. It follows that the demand in the
1 We assume that the monopolist behaves like a price taker in the input market, in fact,
it is possible to introduce an ”external” demand for the same input, coming from many
other small firms in other industries: Think for example of a firm that uses wheat only to
produce biofuel while many firms use wheat to produce bread.
2 The reason for introducing this assumption is explained in footnote 3.
4
input market at this price fully absorbs the existing stock of input, leading
to a profit piM(p∗M) = bα2S2 for the monopolist 3.
Thus, if the input stock is limited and if the market equilibrium condition
in the input market is satisfied, entry in the output market is automatically
blocked, guaranteeing the persistence of monopoly, unless an external shock
takes place. This situation corresponds to what Bain christened as blockaded
entry. Notice that this conclusion holds when the monopolist’s technology
to produce the final good does not allow the use of an alternative input.
2.2 Entry
Now assume that the incumbent has to face a shock on input supply, leading
to an increase ∆S in its availability. Consequently the total amount of input
in the downstream market is now S +∆S = φ(∆S). This shock could follow
from the entry of another seller in the upstream market or from a discovery
of a new source of a raw (or primary) factor. Then, the monopoly position
of the incumbent is threatened in the output market since a potential en-
trant can now buy this increase in input, and produce the same output. We
assume that the potential entrant has the same technology as the incum-
bent firm. Two opportunities are opened to the monopolist in order to avoid
competition in the output market (see Fig 1). In the first, he completely
forecloses the input market buying the total amount of the input increase
∆S (deterred entry). In the second, he accommodates entry, in which case
he can either partially ration the potential entrant buying some restricted
part of ∆S (partial accommodation) or allow him to freely enter the market
(full accommodation). In the two last subcases, we assume that the incum-
bent and the entrant play a Cournot game in the output market and behave
as price takers in the input market while the price in the latter adjusts at
equilibrium. Under partial accommodation, they play a constrained duopoly
in the output market since the entrant cannot produce at free Cournot, being
rationed in the input market.
In the following, we study the subgame perfect equilibrium of the game
described above in which the incumbent chooses between the strategies ”de-
ter” or ”accommodate” in the first stage and, if he has chosen the strategy
"accommodate", the entrant and the incumbent select in the second stage
the quantities purchased in the input market. These quantities in turn un-
3The above analysis is only valid when α ≤ 1 for otherwise the quantity produced in the
output market would generate a demand in the input market which could not be met, given
the available stock. In order to consider the case when α > 1, it would be necessary to
reconsider the way we have determined the level of output in the final market, because the
optimal solution would then be constrained by input availability in the upstream market.
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Figure 1: The Game
ambiguously determine the corresponding output levels in the downstream
market.
2.2.1 Deterred entry
Under this alternative, the incumbent buys the whole input supply φ(∆S)
available in the market. We assume that this purchase is done at the previous
price level, i.e. at the monopoly price p∗M 4. Accordingly, this entails an
additional cost equal of p∗M∆S, leading to a new total cost (a−2bq∗M)αφ(∆S).
Notice however that, in spite of the existence of this increase in input, the
firm will go on producing the quantity q∗M , which is the optimal one at the
running monopoly price. This additional cost is sustained only in order
to deter entry: the incumbent overinvests with the only aim to foreclose the
downstream market to new entrants. The profit pi′M at deterred entry obtains
as
pi
′
M = b(q
∗
M)
2 − (a− 2bq∗M)α∆S. (1)
2.2.2 Full accommodation
If entry is fully accommodated, the incumbent plays a Cournot game with
the entrant in the output market. Given the demand function in this market,
4 This assumption means that the input price does not adjust infinitely fast to its new
equilibrium value. Otherwise, it would mean again blockaded entry, since at this new
equilibrium price, no input is left available to a potential entrant.
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the quantity produced by each firm is given by
q1 = q2 =
1
3bα
(aα− p),
with a resulting profit pic(p) for the incumbent
pic(p) =
1
9
(aα− p)2
bα2
.
The corresponding price p∗c obtains as the solution of the equation
2
3
1
bα2
(aα− p) = φ(∆S)
namely,
p∗c = aα−
3
2
bα2φ(∆S).
Before figuring out the profit of Cournot competitors, we should state the
conditions over the stock S and the shock ∆S, in order for p∗c to be non-
negative, namely (φ(∆S) =)S + ∆S ≤ 2
3
a
bα
. Recall that from the monopoly
equilibrium we found that the initial stock should also satisfy the condition
S ≤ 1
2
a
bα
. Hence, combining both conditions we obtain the admissible set of
S and ∆S.
Under these conditions, substituting the price p∗c in the profit function of
the incumbent, we obtain
pic (p
∗
c) =
1
4
bα2φ2(∆S). (2)
Using the equality αS = q∗M and equations (1) and (2), the difference between
fully accommodated and deterred entry profits for the incumbent obtains as
1
4
bα2φ2(∆S)− b(q∗M)2 + (a− 2bq∗M)α∆S. (3)
We can replace q∗M by α (φ−∆S) , so as to get the condition under which
entry is fully accommodated as a function of the input supply φ(∆S) and of
the shock on the input market, namely
φ2(∆S) <
4
3
(∆S)(
a
bα
+∆S) (4)
Figure 2 represents the inequality (4) in the {∆S, φ(∆S)}-orthant, as well as
the admissible set
{
∆S, S : ∆S ≤ 1
2
a
bα
∧ S +∆S ≤ 2
3
a
bα
}
, in which the output
price is nonnegative5.
5 Figure 2 obtains under the following parametric values a = b = α = 1 and (S =
)q∗M =
1
4 , for which the admissible set of shocks is
{
∆S : 0 ≤ ∆S ≤ 12
}
.
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Figure 2: Full Accommodation and Entry Deterrence
Given the quantity corresponding to the blockaded entry, q∗M , the in-
tersection of the RHS and LHS parabola in (4) defines the threshold value,
∆˜S, of the shock that induces the incumbent firm to change her strategy
from entry deterrence to accommodation. As long as the availability of the
scarce input does not change for more than ∆˜S, as a result of the shock,
the incumbent will overinvest in non utilized capacity as in Dixit (1980)6.
The bold curve represents the effective amount of input used in production
represented: If the shock induces full accommodation the entire amount of
input S +∆S is going to be injected in the production of output.
The feasibility of the strategy to deter entry through upstream foreclosure
is sensitive to output demand and technology parameters, respectively a, b
and α. The higher the slope of the demand and the efficiency of the incumbent
to produce the good q, the lower the RHS in condition (4), and, accordingly,
the smaller the size of the shock leading the monopolist to deter entry.
Another way to interpret condition (4) consists in expressing it in terms
of the difference between the cost of fully deterring entry and the discrepancy
6Given the technology, the investment in input can be seen as an investment in capacity.
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between the profits obtained by the monopolist when evaluated at two differ-
ent values of the stock, namely S and S +∆S. Let piS+∆SM be the profit that
the monopolist would obtain if the initial stock would be S +∆S in place of
S and C = p∗M∆S the cost to deter entry at equilibrium, then condition (4)
can be rewritten as7
C ≥ piSM −
1
4
piS+∆SM .
Of course, this interpretation is only valid when the price of the essential
input is determined in a competitive market.
2.2.3 Partial accommodation
As we saw earlier, the incumbent can also buy some fraction of the increase
∆S in input supply in order to reduce the amount available to the entrant.
We denote by Z, S < Z < S + ∆S, the total quantity of input purchased
by the incumbent. Since, by assumption, the entrant is constrained to buy
a quantity of input smaller than the one used at the free entry equilibrium,
the Cournot equilibrium in the output market is itself constrained for the
entrant. The maximal amount of input the entrant can buy is thus equal to
S +∆S −Z. The resulting supply of the entrant at the constrained Cournot
equilibrium where the incumbent supplies αZ is the value of her best reply
αa−bα2(S+∆S−Z)−pc
2bα2
. The resulting input price p◦c must satisfy the equilibrium
condition, namely,
1
2
(
aα− bα2(S +∆S − Z)− pc
bα2
) + (S +∆S − Z) = S +∆S
or
p
◦
c = aα− bα2(S +∆S + Z)
Given Z, the profit of the incumbent at the constrained Cournot equilib-
rium now writes as
(a− bα(S +∆S))αZ − (aα− bα2(S +∆S + Z))Z = α2bZ2.
It follows that the profit at the constrained Cournot is monotonically in-
creasing in Z; accordingly it reaches its maximal value at Z = S + ∆S .
Consequently, partial accommodation cannot be in the equilibrium path of
the game. Thus, when the accommodation strategy has been chosen by the
incumbent in the first stage, only full accommodation can be observed in the
second stage. The corresponding input levels bought by the incumbent and
7See appendix 1
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the entrant in the upstream market are 1
2
(S +∆S) for each of them, leading
to the unconstrained Cournot equilibrium in the downstream market. The
following proposition summarizes our findings.
Proposition 1 In the first stage, the incumbent selects the strategy ”deter”
or ”accommodate” according to 8
φ2(∆S) ≷ 4
3
(∆S)(
a
bα
+∆S).
When the incumbent has selected ”accommodate” in the first stage, the incum-
bent and the entrant share total input S+∆S at the second stage equilibrium,
which leads to the free Cournot equilibrium in the output market.
The polar case to the one we have just analyzed consists of assuming that
the input market is controlled by a single seller. Hence, the price and the
quantity of input exchanged are determined in a bilateral monopoly. This is
what we analyze in the next section.
3 Bilateral monopoly
In the framework we consider now there are two agents operating in the
input market, the downstream and the upstream monopolist who supplies
the input inelastically. The revenue function of the downstream monopolist
- from now on the buyer - originates from the demand function of the final
output and the price selected by the upstream monopolist. As for the revenue
of the upstream monopolist firm - from now on the seller -, it is equal to the
price the seller chooses times the quantity of input selected at that price by
the buyer. In this situation, the seller is totally free to decide the share of
the stock S she wants to sell to the buyer. Consequently, the buyer in the
input market cannot do better than accept the price set by the seller.
Under these assumptions, it is easy to derive the optimal price to be
selected by the seller and accordingly the quantity exchanged in the mar-
ket. Given p the input quantity demanded by the buyer obtains from profit
maximization in the output market, namely
zM(p) =
αa− p
2bα2
.
8When the condition is satisfied as an equality, the incumbent deters entry since he
buys the entire amount of input in the upstream market.
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Accordingly, the profit of the seller, expressed as a function of p, writes as(
αa− p
2bα2
)
p
The optimal p˜ is then given by
p˜M = max
{
(a− 2bαS)α; αa
2
}
.
The maximum obtains at p˜M = αa2 whenever
a
4bα
≤ S, while it obtains at
p˜M = (a − 2bαS)α whenever the reverse inequality holds 9. Thus, a priori,
two cases can arise in the input market: either the quantity exchanged,
z˜ = a
4bα
is strictly smaller than S or exactly equal to S. In order to make the
following entry analysis symmetric with the analysis when the input market
is competitive, we exclude this possibility by assuming from the outset that
a
4bα
≥ S. Hence, unless an external shock increases the level of input at the
level S +∆S no entry can occur. Consequently we pursue our investigation
by assuming that only a shock in the input supply can lead to entry.
3.1 Entry
Since the incumbent firm cannot induce the upstream monopolist from sell-
ing to the entrant part of the excess input created by the shock, there is no
longer any first mover advantage for the incumbent: deterring entry by ma-
nipulating the input market can no longer be practised. Accordingly, when
a free Cournot can obtain in the downstream market, total demand in the
input market is given by
zc(p) =
2
3bα2
(aα− p),
and the profit of the upstream monopolist then writes as
2
3bα2
(aα− p)p.
9In the first case, the corresponding quantity exchanged in the input writes as
z˜ =
a
4bα
,
while in the output market the equilibrium price is 3a4 and quantity is
a
4b . Notice that, using
the inequalities α ≤ 1 and a4bα ≤ S, it is straightforward to show that the price of the
output under bilateral monopoly exceeds the price when the input market is competitive.
This reflects the market power of the seller in the upstream market.
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Profit maximization yields
p˜c =
αa
2
,
with corresponding total quantity of input z˜c = a3bα . Hence,
Proposition 2 The downstream monopolist cannot prevent entry by manip-
ulating the input market; the ensuing structure of the final market, namely,
constrained or free Cournot, depends on the condition
a
3bα
≶ S +∆S.
When the stock exchanged is such that the downstream firms play a free
Cournot, that is, when a
3bα
≤ S + ∆S, non utilized capacity can be observed
at equilibrium.
The only remaining possibility for avoiding competition in the down-
stream market consists in reaching a cooperative agreement with the owner
of the input resource. This agreement would take the form either of a merger
or of a long term contract 10 between the upstream and downstream mo-
nopolies. A necessary condition for the feasibility of this agreement is that
there exists a possibility of sharing between the merger entities a joint profit,
which exceeds the sum of the profits they could realise while staying out of
the cooperative agreement. It is easy to check that this condition is indeed
satisfied by direct comparison of the profits obtained in each of these alterna-
tives (see appendix 2). As for the explicit solution to the bargaining problem
raised by this situation, it cannot obtain without further restrictions on the
bargaining process itself. Summarizing the above comments we get
Proposition 3 In order to prevent entry in the downstream market, there
exists a production level in this market at which the corresponding profit of
the merger entity exceeds the sum of the profits realised by the firms when
entry is allowed in the downstream market.
4 Conclusion
We have studied how an incumbent monopolist can weaken potential rivals
or deter entry in the output market by manipulating the access in the market
for an essential input. Our analysis is based on a number of simplifying as-
sumptions, like the use of the same linear technolology by the incumbent and
10See Aghion and Bolton (1987).
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the entrant or the presence of only one productive factor which is indispens-
able to production of the output. Natural extensions would be to explore the
implications of alternative assumptions like an entrant using a more efficient
technology or a production function including more than a single input. But
the purpose of this paper was not to exhaust the possible details underly-
ing the analysis of this problem, but simply to draw the attention of some
scholars on this less known practise of upstream market foreclosure.
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5 Appendix
5.1 Appendix 1
Remind that the profit of each firm under free Cournot is pic = 14B(S+∆S)
2
and the profit of the monopolist under blockaded entry is piSM = BS2, where
B = bα2
We can express the blockaded entry profit according to the level of initial
stock in the input market. If the stock is S+∆S, the profit of the monopolist
obtains as piS+∆SM = B(S + ∆S)
2, from which we can express BS∆S as
piS+∆SM −piSM−pi∆SM
2
.
Returning to the expression of the profit under free Cournot, namely
1
4
(BS2 + 2BS∆S + ∆S2), we can now replace the term BS∆S in this ex-
pression to obtain
pic =
1
4
piSM +
piS+∆SM − piSM − pi∆SM
4
+
1
4
pi∆SM .
Rearranging the terms, we get
pic =
1
4
piS+∆SM .
Hence, given the cost to deter entry C = p∗M∆S, condition (4), if entry is
accommodated, writes as
C > piSM −
1
4
piS+∆SM .
5.2 Appendix 2
In this appendix, we show that the cooperative solution between the down-
stream and upstream monopolists gives them a higher total profit then the
sum of the profits they obtain when entry is accommodated in the output
market. This constitutes a necessary condition for merging. The joint profit
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maximization leads to the use of an amount of input equal to a
2αβ
. Substitut-
ing this value in the expression of the joint profit (a− bαZ)αZ, we get that
the profit under merger obtains as a2
4b
.
When entry is accommodated, the profit of the downstream firm, as a
Cournot competitor, amounts to a2−2aαbS
12b
, to which we must add the profit
obtained by the input seller at equilibrium in the bilateral case, namely
a2
6b
.Summing these two magnitudes we get the total profit realized by the
downstream and upstream monopolist under entry accommodation, namely
3a2−2αabS
12b
. A direct comparison of joints profits and profits obtained under
accommodation shows that merging is always more profitable.
∂
∂Z
((a− bα(S +∆S))αZ − pZ) = aα− p− (S +∆S)bα2
p = aα− (S +∆S)bα2
((a− bα(S +∆S))αZ − (aα− (2 (S +∆S) + Z)bα2)Z) = Zα (a− bα (S + S∆))−
Z (aα− bα2 (2S + Z + 2S∆)) = α2bZ (S + S∆+ Z)
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